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Cultural governance and pictorial 
resistance: reﬂections on the 
imaging of war
DAV I D  C A M P B E L L
Introduction
If we assume that the state has no ontological status apart from the many and varied
practices that bring it into being, then the state is an artefact of a continual process
of reproduction that performatively constitutes its identity. The inscription of
boundaries, the articulation of coherence, and the identiﬁcation of threats to its
sense of self can be located in and driven by the ofﬁcial discourses of government.
But they can equally be located in and driven by the cultural discourses of the
community, and represented in sites as ‘unofﬁcial’ as art, ﬁlm and literature. While
such cultural locations are often taken to be the sites of resistance to practices of
government, their oppositional character is neither intrinsic nor guaranteed. Indeed,
states have often engaged in or beneﬁted from practices of cultural governance. As
Michael Shapiro argues, cultural governance involves support for diverse genres of
expression to constitute and legitimise practices of sovereignty, while restricting or
preventing those representations that challenge sovereignty.1 In this sense, cultural
governance is a set of historical practices of representation – involving the state but
never fully controlled by the state – in which the struggle for the state’s identity is
located.
In this article, I focus on some issues concerning the visual media’s representation
of recent wars as a means of exploring cultural governance in the contemporary
period. Focusing on elements of the news media, ﬁlm and documentary photo-
graphy, this article explores how these diverse genres have contributed to the
expression of collective identity. Arguing from a position in which governance and
resistance are understood to be intrinsically related practices rather than discrete
modes of acting, this article also explores the pictorial challenges to common under-
standings that underpin the collective identities enabled by cultural governance.2 The
story begins with a ﬁlm.
A ﬁlm fable
Long before the United States, Britain and Australia invaded Iraq, before the attack
on the World Trade Center precipitated Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan,
and prior to the NATO intervention in Kosovo and the Monica Lewinsky scandal,
Barry Levinson’s ﬁlm Wag the Dog (1997) told the story of a president compromised
by sexual misconduct who deﬂects the scandal by engineering a foreign crisis in a
faraway land. Based upon the plan of an intelligence operative (Conrad Brean,
played by Robert de Niro), a Hollywood producer (Stanley Motts, played by Dustin
Hoffman) is engaged to construct the appearance of a war. Disturbed by the notion
that this ruse is untrue and will inevitably be exposed, both the nervous producer
and anxious White House staffers are placated by Brean’s belief that the truth makes
no difference once the aura of a scandal takes hold.
Central to establishing the truth for both of the competing stories (the president’s
alleged affair and the emerging war) is the public use of photographs. News reports
detailing the allegations of sexual misconduct are anchored by an image of the
president with the girl who later made allegations against him. Likewise, in his effort
to convince Motts that a Hollywood producer is ideally placed to simulate a war,
Brean asserts that war is a performance remembered for its slogans rather than its
speciﬁcities. After running through a series of iconic black and white images that are
almost subliminally cut into the ﬁlm – ‘naked girl covered in napalm’; ‘V for
victory’; ‘ﬁve marines raising the ﬂag on Mount Surabachi’ – Brean asserts ‘you
remember the picture 50 years from now; you will have forgotten the war’. Similarly
for the Gulf War: ‘smart bomb falling down a chimney; 2500 missions a day; 100
days; one video; one bomb . . . the American people bought that war . . . war is
show business . . . that’s why we’re here’, Brean says.
Brean directs Mott to think of the war as a pageant, something with a theme,
song and visuals. Of course, given that the proposed war has no actuality, the images
have to be created from scratch. First off, an enemy has to be put in place, and
Brean opts for Albania on the grounds that no one has heard of it and no one
knows anything about Albanians. This permits Brean to conclude they must
therefore be shifty, standoff-ish and untrustworthy. On this foundation, Motts starts
to weave a narrative of fundamentalist danger and the threat of nuclear
proliferation, with Albanian terrorists attempting to smuggle a ‘suitcase bomb’ over
the Canadian border into the US.
Embodying conﬂict often requires that someone be cast in the role of victim. To
this end, Motts’ constructs an image of a ‘young girl in rubble . . . driven from her
home by Albanian terrorists’ as the pivot for popular support to justify the military
mobilisation. Captivated by the idea of having grainy, hand-held news footage with
her clutching a kitten while running from the ruins, a series of models’ photographs
are scanned to select the suitable candidate. Rejecting one for being ‘too Texan’,
Motts and his staff settle on a beautiful young blonde and dress her to ﬁt the
stereotype of East European peasant, head scarf and all. After dismissing the make-
up lady – because the victim has to look like ‘she’s been raped by terrorists’ – the
actress makes a couple of runs towards the camera against the standard blue TV
background that allows images to be manipulated around her. The production staff,
sitting on high in the control room perusing picture library ﬁles for suitable elements
58 David Campbell
of the shot, digitally add the kitten along with a backdrop of a devastated village on
ﬁre, a bridge over a stream, and a soundtrack of screams and sirens. Mocked up in a
few hours, the simulated news footage is leaked via satellite and instantaneously
broadcast by a 24-hour news channel. After it is shown and described, the
newscaster concludes, ‘America has seldom witnessed a more poignant picture of the
human race’. In place of the president’s alleged affair, the news media had been fed a
new story to consume endlessly.
News media and contemporary war
The propaganda practices that make up the plot of Wag the Dog may be crude and
ﬁctional, but they do highlight elements found in the news media’s coverage of
contemporary war. The insatiable appetite of a twenty-four hour news cycle, the
proliferation of cable and satellite channels, the emotional value of feminised
victims, the historical resonance of iconic images, and the ofﬁcial appreciation of all
these factors, can all be located in recent coverage.
One of the lessons the Pentagon took from Vietnam was that the power of
television meant control of the military’s message was central to the success of their
operations. As such, the combination of independent reporting and regular military
brieﬁngs (the infamous ‘ﬁve o’clock follies’) US ofﬁcials used to conduct daily in
Saigon were to be restricted. Learning also from the British experience in the
Falklands, the US developed constraints for media coverage of its operations in
Grenada and Panama, before deploying them most successfully during the Gulf War
of 1990–91. By arranging selected media representatives into pools – which would
then be handled by military liaison staff and given only restricted access to the
battleﬁeld – and organising military brieﬁngs around video images the Pentagon
itself produced, the Pentagon effectively controlled the story of its campaign.3
The success of military media management in the Gulf War led to the 1992
promulgation of the ‘Principles of Coverage’. These principles state that the US
military should, as quickly as is practicable, but cognisant of any possible impact on
military operations, provide reporters with independent access to combat operations.
In practice, those principles were not applied in Operation Enduring Freedom in
Afghanistan.4 According to New York Times columnist Maureen Dowd:
Military reporters say they are more handcuffed now than during Desert Storm. They have
had only the most restricted and supervised access to Special Operations units. Even reporters
who went to Afghanistan with Marines found themselves quarantined in warehouses and
handed press releases from Central Command in Tampa about casualties less than 100 yards
away. Some who got close to the action had ﬁlm conﬁscated and guns pointed at them by
Special Operations soldiers or their mujahedeen bullies.5
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In the place of independent journalism, the Pentagon produced its own material.
To cope with the void of imagery in the opening weeks of the US military operation,
the Defence Department provided its own pictures, among which the ﬁring of a
cruise missile from a navy ship, the American ﬂag caught in the rocket’s bright
plume, was much used around the world. Phone interviews with groups of pilots
fresh from bombing runs over Afghanistan were arranged and their patriotic
sentiments broadcast far and wide.6 Some operations were themselves designed for
the images they could produce. When US Army Rangers parachuted into a Taliban
airbase near Kandahar in late October 2001, the story of the ﬁrst action by US
ground forces was made possible by the green, grainy night video of troops in action
released by the Pentagon. But the Rangers were not the ﬁrst on the ground, as an
Army Pathﬁnder team had already secured the base to ensure it was safe, leading a
number of senior military ofﬁcials to deride the much covered parachute jump as a
‘television show’ designed largely to inﬂuence public opinion.7
The military’s desire to increasingly manage information was also made clear by
the strange case of the proposed Ofﬁce for Strategic Inﬂuence (OSI) in the
Pentagon. Throughout the ﬁghting in Afghanistan, the US and Britain established
a series of ‘Coalition Information Centres’ in Washington, London and Islamabad
in order to produce coordinated messages and rebuttals concerning alliance
strategy, and have them available for the ceaseless global news cycle. Having been
caught off guard by Osama Bin Laden’s release of video messages to the media
through Al-Jazeera, the Bush administration opted to expand the ad hoc wartime
arrangements into a new ofﬁce of global diplomacy run by a former advertising
executive.8 But it is the plans for the OSI that has been most revealing. Concerned
with ‘information operations’ to inﬂuence foreign audiences, it was envisaged after
September 11th that the OSI would coordinate everything from factual news
releases to foreign advertising campaigns (billboards in Pakistan with images of the
World Trade Centre under attack was one suggestion) to covert disinformation
programmes designed to plant pro-American stories in the international media,
sometimes using private ﬁrms to achieve the strategy.9 The dilemma for the
Pentagon, once OSI’s existence had been revealed, was how to maintain the
credibility of its public statements – how to make clear the Department of Defence
was not engaging in spreading lies, while declaring that its strategy was to engage in
‘tactical deception’ of people beyond the US.10 In an ironic outcome, Secretary of
Defence Donald Rumsfeld claimed that ‘the misinformation and adverse publicity’
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OSI attracted meant that it had to be closed.11 Which does not mean that its
activities no longer occur, just that they take place within existing Pentagon ofﬁces
or through private subcontractors to the US government.
One of those private domains and corporate spheres through which American
strategic information operations has been and will be pursued is Hollywood. While
reporters from ABC’s news division (along with those from CNN and others) were
not able to gain access to the military in the Afghan battleﬁeld, the same restrictions
did not apply to representatives from ABCs entertainment division. In the aftermath
of September 11th, the satirical magazine The Onion ran an article entitled
‘American Life Turns into Bad Jerry Bruckheimer Movie.’12 It is a notion that was
strangely prescient. Bruckheimer, the producer of successful blockbusters such as
Top Gun, Pearl Harbour, and Black Hawk Down, joined forces with the television
producer behind the reality programme ‘Cops’ to develop a ‘patriotic’ series about
US soldiers ﬁghting the war against terrorism. All Bruckheimer’s ﬁlms have
portrayed the US military favourably, which is not surprising given they were made
with the Pentagon’s assistance and blessing (in the case of Black Hawk Down, they
provided the Apache helicopters and one hundred soldiers on location in Morocco).
Similar cooperation made the six hour-long episodes of the ‘Proﬁles from the
Frontline’ project possible, with the Pentagon guaranteeing access to those US
troops in Afghanistan and around the world previously shielded from news
journalists.13 Screened on network television in the month prior to the invasion of
Iraq, ‘Proﬁles’ provided a visual link for the war on terror from Afghanistan to Iraq,
and gave both the media and the viewers a clear idea as to how the strategy of
‘embedding’ journalists with military units would produce a paean to valour and
virtue.14
The Bruckheimer production of the war on terrorism will not be the only
Hollywood ﬁlm effort in this new patriotic struggle. There is, of course, a long
history of Hollywood’s association with US military causes, so cooperation post-
September 11th is hardly novel. Nonetheless, the willingness of all branches of the
television and ﬁlm industry to meet President Bush’s top political advisor Karl Rove
in November 2001 reﬂected, as the head of Paramount Pictures said, ‘this incredible
need, this incredible urge to do something.’15 Notwithstanding the administration
and industry’s assertions that there is no question of the government control of
content, it is clear from such views that ofﬁcial control, let alone censorship, would
be redundant. Moreover, increasingly positive portrayals of US national security
issues predate September 11th. After years of declining even media comment, let
alone media assistance, and reaping a negative image in ﬁlm and television as a
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result, the CIA appointed a former Latin American specialist as a full-time enter-
tainment liaison ofﬁcer. With the promise of ofﬁcial cooperation, scriptwriters and
producers have submitted their work for approval, and incorporated suggestions
from CIA staff. The result has been some three television series and ﬁve feature ﬁlms
in which the agency is ﬂatteringly featured as hard-working and heroic, though some
(such as the Robert Redford movie Spy Game and the television series 24) were
completed and shown even though agency approval was withheld.16
It is important to understand – so that we can appreciate the full extent of the
challenge that faces those who want to develop a politically critical stance in relation
to developments and issues such as those outlined here – that the interweaving and
interdependence of the military, media and information industries is neither an
unforeseen accident or a failure of nerve on the part of the participants (especially
the media). This blurring of what previously appeared to be distinct domains is the
core of the new military strategy that results from the ‘ Revolution in Military
Affairs’ (RMA) that has preoccupied the Pentagon for some time.17 The RMA is
concerned with how networked information technology is integrated into and
changes the battleﬁeld for the US military. One of the principal changes that result
from this is a different understanding of the nature and extent of ‘the battleﬁeld’.
No longer conﬁned to a spatial or temporal exception, it stems from what James Der
Derian has called the ‘military-industrial-media-entertainment network (MIME-
NET)’.18 While the interaction of civilian and military technologies is not a recent
development, what is new about MIME-NET, Der Derian argues, ‘is the power of
MIME-NET to seamlessly merge the production, representation, and execution of
war. The result is not merely the copy of a copy, or the creation of something new:
It represents a convergence of the means by which we distinguish the original and
the new, the real from the reproduced.’19 This seamless merging of production,
representation and execution comes about because ‘the new wars are fought in the
same manner as they are represented, by military simulations and public dissimul-
ations, by real-time surveillance and TV live-feeds. Virtuality collapses distance,
between here and there, near and far, fact and ﬁction.’20 As a result, the battleﬁeld is
now global and inclusive, overriding previous boundaries between the military and
civilian, combatant and non-combatant, participant and observer. In such a world,
the Pentagon’s suffocating restrictions on the press, the demise of news programmes
in the face of entertainment alternatives, intimate relations between Hollywood and
the national security establishment, and the conduct of military operations for their
information outcomes and representational value in the struggle for strategic
inﬂuence, are the norm rather than the exception.
From the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the story of Private Jessica Lynch’s ‘rescue’
demonstrates the ever-increasing cultural governance of the news media by the
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(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001).
19 Ibid, xx.
20 Ibid, xviii.
military. Lynch’s release was made public through the Coalition Media Centre
(CMC) at the US Central Command headquarters in Qatar. This $1.5m brieﬁng
operation, with a futuristic, Hollywood-inspired set replete with plasma TV screens,
is housed in a remote warehouse hundreds of miles from the battleﬁeld, but offering
the military overview desired by its US, UK, and Australian media minders. The
CMC was integral to the strategy of embedding reporters with military units, for
those on the front line provided images and stories from an unavoidably narrow
perspective, while the journalists at the CMC were given what was said to be the
broad overview but in effect only ampliﬁed the narrow perspective desired by the
Pentagon and its partners. As one media critic observed, the 500 or more ‘embeds’
(with 100 cameras) were ‘close up at the front’ while the 600 CMC journalists were
‘tied up in the rear’. This meant the military could be conﬁdant journalists would
produce ‘maximum imagery with minimum insight’.21
The Lynch story demonstrated how well this operation could function. CMC
journalists were roused from their sleep in the early hours of 2 April, thinking that a
major story (such as the death of Saddam Hussein) was breaking. Instead they were
presented with an edited ﬁve-minute military video – shot through a night lens,
producing green, grainy images of silhouetted ﬁgures – detailing the Special Forces
rescue of Private Lynch. The video encapsulated a narrative familiar to viewers of
Black Hawk Down and Behind Enemy Lines – that the US military ‘never leaves a
fallen comrade’. A single still image was taken from this operation and circulated
widely, showing Lynch lying on a stretcher aboard a US special forces helicopter,
smiling grimly from under a US ﬂag draped across her chest.
That Jessica Lynch is a fair-skinned, 19 year old blonde female from West
Virginia helped spur the stories of heroism surrounding her captivity and rescue.
Said to be suffering gun shot and stab wounds, and having been reportedly mis-
treated during her detention in an Iraqi hospital, a much used Washington Post story
from 3 April cited unnamed sources as describing how Lynch had fought bravely
during the battle of 23 March that led to her capture, ﬁring a weapon repeatedly
despite being hit and seeing many of her comrades killed.22 Unsurprisingly, the
cinematic quality of this description has led to quickly produced TV documentaries
(the Arts and Entertainment network screened ‘Saving Jessica Lynch’ within two
weeks of her rescue) and a massive effort to secure an exclusive interview upon her
recovery, with CBS (which is part of the media conglomerate Viacom) offering a
package of media inducements that included proposals for shows and publications
from CBS News, CBS Entertainment, MTV (who dangled the prospect of Lynch co-
hosting an hour long programme, with a concert held in her home town of Palestine,
West Virginia), Paramount Pictures, and Simon and Schuster books.23
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Apparently Lynch cannot recall any aspect of her time in an Iraqi hospital or
subsequent release. But later media investigations have discovered that most of the
dramatic elements of the early accounts of Lynch’s condition and return are open to
serious question. A BBC documentary, which interviewed staff involved in Lynch’s
care after the war had been declared over, revealed that she had no war wounds but
was diagnosed as a serious road trafﬁc accident victim, had received the best
available treatment from Iraqi medical staff, and that their attempt to return her to
US forces in an ambulance had been repelled at a US military checkpoint.24
While the basic coordinates of Lynch’s story were not invented (she was injured,
captured then recovered), the account was staged, in so far as the particular
narrative that was attached to and derived from the military ﬁlm of her release was
constructed by the Pentagon’s media operation to convey a heroic and redemptive
meaning (implicitly recalling the captivity narratives common in the early days of
American settlement, with Iraq functioning as ‘Indian country’). The power of the
image – both the night-vision video, and the still of Lynch on the stretcher, redolent
of the fair-haired victim in Wag the Dog – was key to the way this account repre-
sented part of the invasion of Iraq. But are there images resistant to such ofﬁcial
discourses of cultural governance?
It is important to remember that, whatever the power of MIME-NET and
information warfare strategies, alternative images to those released and broadcast
are captured all the time. That is because a not insigniﬁcant number of cameramen
and photographers operate independently and unilaterally in war zones. But even
embedded cameramen have recorded shocking images of wars effects that counter
the clean narratives of surgical strikes. The problem is that the media industry itself
operates in terms of codes and norms that mesh with the military’s restrictions and
prevent the public release of such images by invoking conceptions of ‘taste’ and
‘decency’. In this context, it is worth exploring one branch of the media that has not
bowed to these conventions and continues to represent much of the unvarnished
horror of war – the traditions of documentary photography and photojournalism.
This necessitates reﬂecting on concerns about the truth of the photograph, before
examining Don McCullin’s photojournalism as an instance of potential pictorial
resistance to the cultural governance of war’s representation.
Photographs and the question of truth
It might seem anachronistic in the age of digital video and real-time news coverage
to be concerned with the photojournalism of war and the politics of documentary
photography. After all, it has been argued that Biafra (in 1968) was the last war in
which newspapers scooped television, and black and white photographs played a
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major role.25 However, it is interesting to note – as the opening to Wag the Dog
makes clear – when it comes to historical memory the photograph retains a con-
siderable power. Indeed, as Susan Sontag has argued, it might be precisely because of
the ubiquity of television’s visual ﬂow that the arrest of time in the photograph
offers space for contemplation and critique.26
The digital age has, however, had an important impact on contemporary debates
about photography. With the increased capacity for pictorial manipulation arising
from the use of digital cameras and computer imaging, public laments about the
associated loss of authority and truth are common. For example, the new tech-
nology has led Fred Ritchin to wonder how the photograph’s documentary authority
can be maintained when the computer provides no archival notion of an original
photographic negative against which changes and tamperings could be checked. As a
result, Ritchin speculates that ever-increasing digitisation might paradoxically mean
‘a revival of the largely dormant photo essay taken by living, breathing, thinking
photographers; the photograph, unchained from its simplistic role of authentication,
will then be recognized for its linguistic subtlety and broader reach’.27
While computerisation might produce that paradoxical outcome, the resultant
photographic product will not function as a stable referent of objective truth in
contrast to the computer’s indeterminate subjectivism. In large part, that is because
the age of computer-based photography has heightened but not introduced the
element of bias to an otherwise certain domain. Indeed, the digital revolution’s most
important effect has been to end the ‘interlude of false innocence’ in which the
referential veracity of the photographic image was too often unquestioned.28 But
even those who did not assume that photography corresponded directly to the
external world, have sometimes been moved by the computer to a different position.
As John Roberts observes, ‘one of the ironies of the debate on simulation and the
chemical photograph is that all those who previously took documentary photo-
graphy to task for believing in the ‘truth-value’ of the naturalistic image, now talk
nostalgically about the disappearance of documentary’s reportorial and archival
role’.29
The irony of this situation is even more marked if we reﬂect on the way the truth-
value of the photographic image has always been challenged through allegations of
manipulation leading to fraud. Indeed, many of the most famous war photographs
have been the subject of controversy, with at least elements of the alleged naturalism
dispelled. For example, during the American civil war, photographers (such as
Alexander Gardner and Matthew Brady) moved bodies around to make images;30
Robert Capa’s falling Spanish republican soldier is alleged to have been staged (or at
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least consistent with other interpretations, such as someone slipping during
training);31 the image of ﬁve marines raising the ﬂag at Mt Surabachi, Iwo Jima on
23 February 1945 was re-enacted with a different ﬂag some hours after the ﬂag
raising ceremony;32 and General William Westmoreland, former US commander in
Vietnam, claimed in a 1986 speech that Huynh Cong Ut’s 1972 photo of the
Vietnamese girl ﬂeeing a napalm attack showed nothing more than a ‘hibachi
accident at a family bar-b-que’.33 Recently, the still of the Bosnian prisoner Fikret
Alic, emaciated and standing behind a barbed wire fence at the Bosnian Serb-run
Trnjopolje camp – frame-grabbed from an ITN television news report in August
1992 by newspapers and magazines around the world – has (wrongly) been declared
a misleading fabrication by those with an interest in denying the charge of genocide
against Serbian commanders.34
In a similar vein is the controversy surrounding Arthur Rothstein’s photographs
of the South Dakota drought during the Depression. Rothstein placed a locally
obtained cow skull against various backdrops to obtain an image of the economic
and environmental plight of farmers in the area. As part of the famous Farm
Security Administration’s (FSA) photographic unit, which did so much to establish
the reputation of documentary photography as a progressive social practice, Rothstein
was part of the effort to visualise the Depression in such a way that enabled New
Deal policies. As such, regional newspapers opposed to the economic strategies of
the New Deal seized on Rothstein’s work as a way of supposedly demonstrating that
such policies were based on ‘trickery’.35
Given the political stakes in the debate around Rothstein’s image, the controversy
almost brought a premature end to the FSA photographic unit by putting in doubt
the aura of naturalist veracity its work had acquired.36 Even some of Rothstein’s
colleagues were appalled by his action. Walker Evans, one of the FSA’s most famous
photographers and one of the most noteworthy photographers of the twentieth
century, declared ‘that that’s where the word “documentary” holds: you don’t touch
a thing. You “manipulate”, if you like, when you frame a picture – one foot one way
or one foot another. But you’re not sticking anything in.’37
Evans’ stipulation that one can ‘manipulate’ in terms of picture selection and
composition, but one cannot ‘stick anything in’, requires a ﬁne but tenuous sense of
legitimate practice. It ﬂows, of course, from a conventional sense of the meaning of
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photography, a traditional understanding of the genre of documentary, and associated
theories of reality and truth that undergird each. However, each of the above
examples of controversial war pictures demonstrates the way in which these well
understood realist accounts of photography are largely insufﬁcient in making sense
of the politics of photography. That is because in each of the cases there is no fraud
equivalent to the obviously staged nineteenth-century images of fairies at the bottom
of the garden, equivalent attempts to portray the Loch Ness monster or UFOs, or
the manipulative construction of the Albanian victim in Wag the Dog. In each of
the above cases, none of the critics doubt the basic elements of the images were
there; what they doubt are the meanings most derive from the use of such images.
Which raises the interesting prospect that a realist image may be a poorer conveyer
of truth than either a heavily interpreted or even partially constructed image (such
as Rothstein’s cow skull). If we accept that, then what is the line – if any such line
exists – between Rothstein’s cow skull and Wag the Dog’s Albanian beauty?
One of the major problems with war photography that focuses on victims as an
antidote to heroic images is that it can produce a generalised and standardised visual
account that anonymises victims and depoliticises conﬂict.38 This results in what
Allen Feldman calls ‘cultural anaesthesia’, and effects what Martha Rosler has
termed the revictimisation of victims.39 Moreover, given the importance of photo-
graphy in the emergence of social science discourses such as anthropology and
criminology in the late nineteenth century, the reduction of the mobile and multiple
contingencies of personhood to the ﬁgure of a static, one-dimensional victim have a
long history. As John Tagg observes, in turn-of-the-century social science ‘the
working classes, colonised peoples, the criminal, poor, ill-housed, sick or insane were
constituted as the passive – or, in this structure, “feminised” – objects of knowledge.
Subjected to a scrutinising gaze, forced to emit signs, yet cut off from command of
meaning, such groups were represented as, and wishfully rendered, incapable of
speaking, acting or organising for themselves.’40
The issue to consider, then, is whether being ‘culturally anaesthetic’ is an
inevitable and unavoidable element of the photographic representation of victims of
war, and to ask what are modes of photographic representation that can dissimulate
if not dispense with such depoliticising effects? To locate this questioning, I will look
at the work of noted British photojournalist Don McCullin.
Don McCullin and the ghosts of victims
Known in particular for his photographs of the conﬂict in Cyprus, the war-driven
famine of Biafra, the ﬁghting in Vietnam and the refugees created by the secession
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of East Pakistan, Don McCullin readily acknowledges that his photography is
preoccupied with often personalised images of atrocity. ‘I thought of my pictures as
atrocity pictures. They were not of war but of the dreadful plight of victims of
war.’41 Invariably, though not exclusively, composed of one or two individuals in a
situation of distress, McCullin’s dark, tonal images brood with a violence that
exceeds the events being depicted.
The force of these images – what McCullin describes as their ‘ﬁst-like black and
white’ quality – is not something developed because of the fetishistic pleasure of
death and disaster.42 As Mark Haworth-Booth has observed, McCullin’s ‘photo-
graphy of suffering has been a kind of service’ to its audience.43 The nature of that
service? To be a witness – ‘someone who epitomises the role of witness to the despair
of our time’,44 ‘our eye-witness’, a ‘passionately eloquent witness’ whose work is
itself a ‘witness to history’.45
Essential to the role of witness for McCullin is emotion. ‘Photography for me is
not looking, it’s feeling. If you can’t feel what you’re looking at, then you’re never
going to get others to feel anything when they look at your pictures.’46 What
McCullin feels more often than not is a combination of disgust at the violent
circumstances embracing the innocent, and an empathy with those who become the
victims of war. Indeed, for McCullin that empathy is so strong he shares intimately
the danger of those being ﬁred upon. ‘There were times’, McCullin says, ‘looking at
those people when I felt I was looking at a mirror. There was an empathy because of
my background. It never went away from me.’47
Empathetic witnessing, McCullin originally thought, would not be a political
exercise. ‘When I began as a photographer, I believed that my work would suffer if I
allowed it to become political. In the event, it turned out to be nothing but political
for I consistently took the side of the underdog and the under-privileged.’48 This
political exercise in photography was, however, for a clear purpose. By portraying
‘the appalling things we are all capable of doing to our fellow human beings’,
McCullin’s photojournalism sought ‘to stir the conscience of others who can help’;
to show those comfortably at home in Britain . . . how these people were suffering.’49
But while political, McCullin’s pictures, especially those of Biafra, ‘were not
partisan. I would like to think these images brought help to the beleaguered
hospitals with their dying children. I knew my pictures had a message, but what it
was precisely I couldn’t have said – except perhaps, that I wanted to break the hearts
and spirits of secure people.’50
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As the previous quote suggests, the clarity of purpose, in the face of abundant
atrocity, articulated by McCullin, was not matched by the certainty that any of the
images he produced contained within them a clear message, let alone a message that
would automatically induce the sort of practical response required for the situations
depicted. Perhaps for this reason, Don McCullin has been haunted by his work,
often commenting on the presence of ghosts in his world. Reﬂecting on how he
operated during the East Pakistan refugee crisis, McCullin has remarked, ‘I felt as if
I were using the camera as something to hide behind. I stood there feeling less than
human, with no ﬂesh on me, like a ghost that was present but invisible.’51 The motif
extends to the production of the print itself: ‘If I’m printing a picture of a man
whose wife lies dead before him, or the albino boy in Biafra, the moment I see them
appearing through the fog of the developer it’s as if they are still alive, and the full
force of the tragedy comes ﬂooding back’.52 Not surprisingly, given that a
photojournalist such as McCullin ﬁnds himself surrounded by an archive of still
images of dead people who can be brought back to a limited form of pictorial life,
the retrospective exhibition at the V & A Museum in London displaying McCullin’s
lifetime of work was entitled Sleeping With Ghosts.
Of course, one of the spectres hanging over the status of the documentary
photograph as authentic witness is the code of practice articulated by Walker Evans
and discussed earlier. Evans insisted that the truth of a realistic image can only be
secured by the photographer refraining from meddling in any way with the subject
(beyond the need to compose the shot), and declared that the whole point about
documentary is ‘that you don’t touch a thing’ and you certainly ‘cannot stick
anything in’. It is a view that McCullin – who has argued, ‘what comes into the
frame is truth’ – endorses.53
However, in his role as eyewitness, trying to convey an image to a distant public
that might disturb their collective conscience, McCullin has occasionally violated
Evans’ dictum in a manner akin to Arthur Rothstein’s New Deal photograph. One
case in point is his famous image of a dead North Vietnamese soldier lying, eyes
ﬁxed open and arm outstretched, next to his scattered personal effects – his wallet
with the photo of a young child, along with a letter and other family photos strewn
from an open tin. The placement of these personal effects alongside the body was
something that McCullin created. As he has explained: ‘I saw a whole bunch of
[American] soldiers vandalising his body for souvenirs. I thought there’s got to be
something I can say about this. So I put these things together, I put them there to
make the picture. It was the ﬁrst time I thought I could justify it. And I don’t have
any shame about doing it. It wasn’t the dead soldier that is the statement, it was the
family photographs, the wallet. I was making a still-life.’54
McCullin experienced a similar moment in Biafra. One of his photographs from
that conﬂict shows a solitary girl perched on a wooden bench. Smiling wanly, the
image is notable in part for the girl’s hands crossed in her lap, a pose that would not,
Cultural governance and pictorial resistance 69
51 Ibid., p. 165.
52 Hamilton, ‘Laying some Ghosts to Rest’, p. 299.
53 Ibid.
54 Quoted Ibid., p. 300. The photograph – along with the preceding image showing two guilty-looking
GI’s looting the body (alongside which there are no personal effects) – can be found in McCullin,
Sleeping with Ghosts, pp. 74–5.
save for the obvious distress her body has endured, be out of place in a formal
portrait. McCullin has discussed how this picture was produced:
Before leaving I found a young girl of about sixteen sitting naked in a hut, looking ill and
very frail, but beautiful. Her name, I was told, was Patience. I wanted to photograph her and
asked the orderly if she would persuade the girl to cover the private parts of her body with
her hands so that I could show her nakedness with as much dignity as possible. But the sight
of her stripped me naked of any of the qualities I might have had as a human being. The
whiplash of compassion and conscience never ceased to assail me in Biafra.55
In this case, as many others, the portrayal of the victim’s dignity was McCullin’s
purpose. Commenting on his experience of covering a famine in the Bihar region of
India, McCullin observed ‘no heroics are possible when you are photographing
people who are starving. All I could do was try to give the people caught up in this
terrible disaster as much dignity as possible.’56 In common with a photojournalist
like Sebastiao Salgado, McCullin has made dignity the leitmotif of his work.
Equally in common with Salgado, the portrayal of dignity has meant that McCullin’s
work has entered the debate about the place and role of aesthetic values in atrocity
pictures.57
The identiﬁcation of beauty in the midst of disaster is controversial and contest-
able. While the alleged timelessness and universality of images like the McCullin
photograph of Patience are often taken to be the product of the aestheticisation of
the image, and this is taken to be one way to make an image stand out despite its
generalisable quality, critics such as Robin Andersen maintain that aestheticisation
only further depoliticises the issue at hand, especially when tragedy is the product of
agony beautiﬁed. As Andersen remarks, ‘the beautiﬁcation of squalid reality offers
the viewer a certain amount of emotional distance. This distancing lessens the
impact, and in the process the media have created a public which has learned not to
care much.’58
Such effects would be contrary to most photojournalists’ hopes. They would
certainly be contrary to what McCullin has aimed for with his documentary work.
Nonetheless, the standard critique of McCullin’s work is that his overriding emphasis
on subjects either alone, or framed with another in a similar state of suffering, is
highly problematic. As Andersen writes:
In McCullin’s work, and in much of the work of photographers who have come after him,
neither starvation’s victims nor victims of war are shown in a social context. They don’t
explain or inform. They become suffering individuals of the human condition. The social and
political – human made – causes are not in appearance, and therefore not in the image. And
many times, indeed most, the news context does not supply adequate information and
explanations.59
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In Andersen’s view, ‘without a social or political context, and without information
or explanations which would explain or account for suffering, photographs which
document pain, misery and death cannot elicit public concern and empathy’.60
For one concerned to emphasise the importance of context, Andersen makes a
deﬁnitive and emphatic judgement about what the photograph alone can and cannot
do. It is, moreover, a judgement that differs in some respects from John Berger’s
meditation on the potential impact of what he calls atrocity photos. Moved to write
after viewing a McCullin photo from Vietnam, Berger opined that such images had
one predominant purpose:
They bring us up short. The most literal adjective that could be applied to them is arresting.
We are seized by them . . . As we look at them, the moment of the other’s suffering engulfs us.
We are ﬁlled with either despair or indignation. Despair takes on some of the other’s suffering
to no purpose. Indignation demands action. We try to emerge from the moment of the
photograph back into our lives. As we do so, the contrast is such that the resumption of our
lives appears to be a hopelessly inadequate response to what we have just seen.61
The terms of Berger’s reading are, of course, loaded, the only options for response
being ‘despair’ versus ‘indignation’, with despair having no purpose. Berger is
interested in whether a photograph can politicise understanding, and appears to
endorse Roland Barthes’ notion that ‘photography is subversive not when it
frightens, repels, or even stigmatises, but when it is pensive, when it thinks’.62 In this
context, Berger claims ‘it is not possible for anyone to look pensively at such a
moment [of agony, as in McCullin’s photos] and emerge stronger’.63
Although he wants to rule out this possible effect, Berger nonetheless thinks that
the war photo is contradictory. While it is assumed to awaken concern, once the
reader who is arrested by the image emerges from it to carry on with her life, the
disjuncture of the experience will leave her, says Berger, feeling morally inadequate.
That inadequacy may now shock her as much as the war itself, and either she shrugs
that paradox off or ‘ [s]he thinks of performing a kind of penance – of which the
purest example would be to make a contribution to OXFAM or to UNICEF’.
Whatever the response, concludes Berger, ‘the issue of the war which had caused
that moment is effectively depoliticised. The picture becomes evidence of the general
human condition. It accuses nobody and everybody.’64 Andersen thinks atrocity
photos cannot elicit concern and sympathy, while Berger thinks they do provoke a
response, but one that is misplaced and unhelpful.
Concluding reﬂections
Those differences notwithstanding, both Andersen’s and Berger’s accounts burden
the image itself with the responsibility for politicisation, rather than viewing it in the
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intertextual context of the news, information, captions, layout, outlets and the like.
This emphasis on the power of the image itself would be consistent with the thematic
view that we are witnessing in social theory a ‘pictorial turn’ that is taking over from
the ‘linguistic turn’ of twentieth century philosophy. However, this identiﬁcation of
the importance of the pictorial does not mean that we have to invent a new and
singular mode of analysis for the visual.65 As W. J. T. Mitchell argues, ‘whatever the
pictorial turn is, then, it should be clear that it is not a return to naïve mimesis, copy
or correspondence theories of representation, or a renewed metaphysics of pictorial
“presence”; it is rather a postlinguistic, postsemiotic rediscovery of the picture as a
complex interplay between visuality, apparatus, institutions, discourse, bodies, and
ﬁgurality’.66 As such, Mitchell’s argument chimes with Susan Sontag’s view that
while the photograph is signiﬁcant because of its capacity to engender a space for
thought, it cannot by itself be an instrument for change. Sontag maintains the image
can help build or reinforce a moral position, but it cannot create such a position in
the absence of ‘an appropriate context of feeling and attitude’.67 In other words, the
photograph requires the politics produced by the interplay of image and context
about which Mitchell writes. Moreover, the photograph requires the overt and
committed politics of a photojournalist like Don McCullin.
As a practice of resistance, documentary photography has its work cut out. The
speed at which (dis)information circulates in the media-managed battle space means
the time for contemplation and critique offered by the still image is more com-
pressed than ever. Nonetheless, while the images alone are unlikely to lead to change,
especially in the short time available, they become part of what Sontag calls the vast
repository of pictures that make it difﬁcult to sustain the ‘moral defectiveness’ of
ignorance or innocence in the face of suffering. Images may only be an invitation to
pay attention. But the questions photographs of war and atrocity pose should be
required of our leaders and us: ‘Who caused what the picture shows? Who is
responsible? Is it excusable? Was it inevitable? Is there some state of affairs which we
have accepted up to now that ought to be challenged?’68
The conclusion Sontag reaches is a battle cry in which the picture functions as a
ghost: ‘Let the atrocious images haunt us. Even if they are only tokens, and cannot
possibly encompass most of the reality to which they refer, they still perform a vital
function. The images say: This is what human beings are capable of doing – may
volunteer to do, enthusiastically, self-righteously. Don’t forget.’69 The Guardian used
this Sontag quote in a short editorial to support its publication, twelve years after
the event, of many previously unseen photographs from the Persian Gulf War.70
Under the title ‘Blood in the Sand’ and edited by Don McCullin, these unsparing
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images ‘reveal[ed] the true horror of the Gulf war’, and their publication was timed
to coincide with the global anti-war marches on 15 February 2003.71
One of the images in this selection was Keith Jarecke’s famous image from the
Gulf War of 1991 (published originally on the front page of The Observer under the
title ‘The Real Face of War’) showing a charred Iraqi corpse still upright in his
vehicle. As evidence of the infamous ‘turkey shoot’ on the Basra road – when allied
jets devastated a vast convoy of Iraqi vehicles after they had ﬂed Kuwait – this
photograph immediately contested the well-established view of the conﬂict as
casualty-free. Against the larger narrative of the conduct of the Gulf War, this
image functioned as a point of disruption, a reminder of what that narrative hid. As
a result, the publication of the photo was immediately controversial, with the
political issues of reportage being contested by complaints of taste. Indeed, in most
newspapers, issues of taste easily trumped the signiﬁcance of the photograph as
editors refused to contemplate its publication.72
Nonetheless, Kenneth Jarecke’s photograph demonstrates the potential (through
its publication both in 1991 and 2003) for such images to serve as a form of ‘post-
reportage’, whereby one can speak in ‘considered retrospect’ of events narrated in
contradictory ways.73 In this context, what photographs can do is ‘provide moments
of silence, caught in the uneasy space between what was experienced there and what
is being experienced here’.74 Evocative of Barthes’ contention that the photograph
produces a different rendering of space-time, and is subversive when it is pensive,
understanding photographs as opening critical spaces for thought (and political re-
enactments) through their narrative positioning is suggestive of one way to promote
photography’s capacity to politicise war – especially when the power of MIME-NET
propels us frighteningly close to the ofﬁcial promulgation of Wag the Dog’s prop-
aganda practices. It is a position that neither dismisses the art gallery as a critical
site for public consumption (especially given the way a gallery and its commentary
fosters contemplation rather than gratiﬁcation), nor insists that a strict adherence to
realist documentary protocols is essential for the truth-value of an image.
With the changing international political economy of the media – in which serious
documentary reportage has given way to the ﬂuff of consumerist lifestyle coverage –
these alternative uses and locations of images are far from being irrelevant to the
development of resistant political positions. Moreover, it demonstrates that pictorial
resistance to the ofﬁcial practices of cultural governance can take place in a
multitude of previously unacknowledged political spaces. What is required, however,
is for that resistance to be timelier, more in tune with the speed of contemporary
war.
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